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Abstract—New security and privacy concerns arise due to
the growing popularity of voice assistant (VA) deployments in
home and enterprise networks. A number of past research
results have demonstrated how malicious actors can use hidden
commands to get VAs to perform certain operations even when a
person may be in their vicinity. However, such work has not
explored how compromised computers that are close to VAs
can leverage the phone channel to exfiltrate data with the help
of VAs. After characterizing the communication channel that
is set up by commanding a VA to make a call to a phone
number, we demonstrate how malware can encode data into
audio and send it via the phone channel. Such an attack, which
can be crafted remotely, at scale and at low cost, can be used to
bypass network defenses that may be deployed against leakage of
sensitive data. We use Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF) tones
to encode arbitrary binary data into audio that can be played
over computer speakers and sent through a VA mediated phone
channel to a remote system. We show that modest amounts of
data (e.g., a kilobyte) can be transmitted with high accuracy with
a short phone call lasting a few minutes. This can be done while
making the audio nearly inaudible for most people by modulating
it with a carrier with frequencies that are near the higher
end of the human hearing range. Several factors influence the
data transfer rate, including the distance between the computer
and the VA, the ambient noise that may be present and the
frequency of modulating carrier. With the help of a prototype
built by us, we experimentally assess the impact of these factors
on data transfer rates and transmission accuracy. Our results
show that voice assistants in the vicinity of computers can pose
new threats to data stored on such computers. These threats are
not addressed by traditional host and network defenses that are
deployed against data theft. We briefly discuss possible ways in
which such threats may be mitigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Voice offers a natural way for people to interact with devices
in their environment which has led to an ever increasing
number of computing devices with embedded microphones
and speakers. At the same time, voice assistants (VAs), which
facilitate such voice interactions, have become commonplace.
For example, according to a report in early 2019, more than
100 million Amazon Alexa or Alexa enabled devices were
sold [25]. Although Amazon Echo and other similar devices
(e.g., Google Home) are commonly deployed in the home
environment, increasingly they are also being used in business
settings. Amazon Alexa Business has advocated the use of VAs
for employee work areas and conference rooms.
Although VAs enable more natural interactions, their con-
nectivity to the network opens them to a variety of new
potential attacks. In recent research [5], [10], [16], [19], [32],
[33], [40], a number of attacks on VAs have been investigated
(see Section II). These attacks primarily focus on issuing
malicious commands to VAs and have also explored how
such commands can be made hidden or inaudible so they
are not noticed by humans who are close to the devices.
These attacks provide important insights into how such devices
can be exploited by attackers but they do not address two
important questions. First, can such attacks be carried out
by a remote actor at scale with low cost? Second, when
computers are in close proximity of VAs, can the VA be
used to exfiltrate sensitive data from these computers? We
investigate attacks where VAs are abused as a bridge between
the Internet and telephony networks to bypass data leakage
protection implemented as a network defense.
As a concrete example in the home setting, consider a laptop
or a home office desktop that is close to a VA. Such computers
can be infected with malware with a variety of attack vectors
including drive-by-downloads, social engineering and others.
Once infected, the malware can choose to locate sensitive data
such as credit card numbers or passwords on the computer and
try to exfiltrate it. Although it may not be the case in home
environment, we assume that host and network defenses that
are employed make it challenging for the malware to connect
with the remote host where it wants to drop the data. However,
another possibility for the malware is to encode the data into
an audio file. The infected computer can issue a command to a
VA to make a phone call and then play the encoded file audio
via its speaker. The phone number to which the call is made
can be controlled by the attacker and the call audio could be
recorded. From such recorded audio, the data can be decoded.
Thus, in this case, data can be exfiltrated from a compromised
computer even in the presence of effective network defenses.
Since malware infections can target a large number of users at
very low cost, such attacks can be crafted at scale and remotely
without being in close proximity of VAs.
We leverage prior research in attacks on VAs that demon-
strate the feasibility of issuing various commands. Unlike past
work, we do not require that the attacker be in the same
physical location as the targeted VA. Also, we utilize the phone
channel for data exfiltration after the VA is commanded to
make a phone call. Although past work has explored audio
networking and audio covert channels extensively [9], [15],
[16], [20], [22], [23], [26] where data is transmitted in audio
form between devices via speakers and microphones, we inves-
tigate the efficacy of such data transfer over a phone channel
that is set up by a VA. Also, similar to hidden commands, we
need to make data transmission unnoticeable when a user may
be in the same area as the infected computer or the VA. The
challenge thus is to transmit data via audio that is unlikely
to be noticed by a human while ensuring accuracy and high
transmission rate. Modulation with an ultrasonic carrier has
been proposed to meet this goal [40] but this requires high
quality speakers that are not available on computers commonly
used in the home and office environments. We demonstrate
that it is possible to use widely available speakers that come
with home and office computers when modulation is done
with a carrier frequency close to the higher end of human
hearing range which provides a tradeoff between inaudibility
and transmission bandwidth. We explore a concrete setting to
explore these questions to quantify the accuracy and bandwidth
of data transmission from an infected computer to a remote
attacker controlled computer via the Alexa voice assistant.
Since malware and targeting of computers by it has been
investigated extensively, in this paper we focus on the ex-
ploitation of VAs by such malware for data exfiltration. More
specifically, we explore if a VA can be commanded to make a
phone call and if sound, which is inaudible to most people, can
be used to encode and send data over such a call. Since the
call may go over a telephony network, only the voiceband
(300–3400 Hz) could be used for such data transfer. This
motivated our use of Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF) [2]
encoding of data by choosing frequencies that avoid overlap-
ping harmonics. Since we modulate the audio with a carrier
frequency that is outside of the voiceband, the telephony
channel will act as a low pass filter and drop frequencies
higher than 3400 Hz. However, because of VA microphone
nonlinearity, encoding DTMF frequencies are reintroduced in
the audio sent over the telephony channel. We demonstrate
that presence of such frequencies is sufficient to decode the
data in the received audio while maintaining the stealthiness of
the audio transmission between the computer speaker and the
voice assistant microphone. We explored the many parameters
that can impact the efficacy of transfer of audio encoded
data when modulated with a very high frequency carrier and
sent over a phone channel via a VA. These include distance
between the infected computer and VA, background noise
level and stealthiness of the audio based on modulating carrier
frequency.
By developing a system and experimentally evaluating it, we
are able to demonstrate that VAs do create a new vulnerability
for data theft which could be a serious concern in enterprise
environments. More specifically, we make the following con-
tributions in this paper.
• We demonstrate the feasibility of data exfiltration from
infected computers that are in close vicinity of a VA.
The data can be sent via the computer speaker to a VA
and then over a phone call. Such attacks can be carried
out at scale by a remote malicious actor who is able to
commandeer a large number of computers that are in the
vicinity of VAs. Thus, unlike much of the past work, we
show this can be done without the attacker being in the
Fig. 1. The Data Flow of Our Scheme.
same physical location as the VA.
• We show that by carefully choosing DTMF and carrier
frequencies, we can make the sound that transmits the
data inaudible to most people while leveraging voice
assistant microphone and phone channel characteristics
to naturally recover the encoding frequencies and decode
the sent data.
• We experimentally estimate the bandwidth of the channel
that is set up to exfiltrate data. We show that a kilobyte
of data can be transmitted with high accuracy by a call
lasting less than 5 minutes in a realistic setting where the
VA may be several feet away from the computer.
• We explore the impact key parameters such as stealthiness
and distance between VAs and infected machines have on
the bandwidth of such exfiltration channels.
• We discuss the effectiveness of a number of possible
defenses against audio encoded data exfiltration attacks.
These include liveness detection for voice assistant com-
mand audio and monitoring of outgoing audio stream that
is fed to computer speakers.
II. RELATED WORK
Security and privacy issues related to VAs have been ex-
plored by many researchers in the recent past. These efforts
have focused on how unauthorized and potentially malicious
commands can be used to target such devices [1], [5], [6],
[10], [19], [21], [29], [33], [39]. Diao et al. [10] demonstrated
that an attacker could inject synthetic audio or play commands
to control a smartphone. However, the commands could also
be noticed by people close to VAs. Carlini et al. [5] first
demonstrated that such commands could be made unnoticeable
to humans while VAs would respond to them in the expected
manner. They used the term hidden commands and a key
contribution of this work was to expand the threat model to
include humans being in the vicinity of the VAs that were
targets of such malicious commands
In another technique that allows a command to be inaudible
to humans but recognized by VAs, researchers have used
ultrasonic sound carriers to hide the commands from being
heard by human [3], [9], [16], [18], [32], [37], [38], [40], [41].
Zhang et al. [40] modulated voice commands on ultrasonic
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carriers (i.e., frequency ≥ 20 kHz) to achieve inaudibility.
These high frequency encoded commands are sent to VAs.
The microphones of VAs can capture the signal at these
frequencies, but people cannot hear them. The nonlinearity
of the microphone acts as the demodulator of the sound
and allows the commands carried on the ultrasonic sound to
be decoded and executed. While Zhang et al. demonstrated
this attack when the speaker is within 10–20 inch range
of the device’s microphone, Roy et al. [32] extended the
attack range of this ultrasonic sound to 25 ft. with a speaker
array. Zhou et al. [41] successfully demonstrated how an
autonomous car can be controlled with hidden commands.
Yan et al. [38] demonstrated how a wave generated by an
ultrasonic transducer can propagate in a solid material (e.g. a
table.) to reach the VA. These attacks, which rely on ultrasonic
sounds, all require speakers of high quality or additional
equipment in close proximity of the target. In our work, we
do not use ultrasonic sound modulation because it cannot
be effectively transmitted via speakers that are commonly
available in computers. We also require that the modulated
sound can be transmitted over an arbitrary distance to an
endpoint controlled by an attacker. We exploit voice assistant
microphone nonlinearity induced demodulation to achieve this
via the voiceband of a telephony channel. Also, previous work
is only focused on issuing malicious commands to VAs, not
on using them for data exfiltration over long distances.
Malicious commands directed at VAs can also be hidden
in other sounds that may not raise an alarm when heard by
humans. Scho¨nherr et al. [33] proposed a method to hide
malicious command in different sounds like songs and sounds
of chirping birds to take control of VAs. Such attacks could be
effective because of psychoacoustic hiding, which is based on
the fact that when human brain is busy processing a loud sound
of a certain frequency, it is likely to ignore other quieter sounds
at adjacent frequencies for a few milliseconds. Such adjacent
frequencies can be used to hide voice assistant commands in
high-frequency audio such as chirping of birds.
Adversarial machine learning methods have also been ex-
plored for hiding malicious audio commands. Carlini et al.
used audio adversarial examples to compromise voice recog-
nition systems in [6]. Such work primarily relied on gen-
erating audio files which are then fed directly to a voice
transcription system, not transmitting the audio through air
to a VA. Abdullah et al. [1] and Yuan et al. [39] presented
more practical adversarial attack techniques that could be used
in a more realistic setting. These works do demonstrate the
feasibility of hidden commands against VAs. However, they do
not investigate how such commands can be used by attackers
to exploit compromised computers.
Covert or side channels based on audio signals have been
explored extensively in the past. Guri et al. [15] utilized the
noise emitted from the CPU and chassis fans to transmit data
bits from computers. Hanspatch et al. [16] presented a covert
acoustical mesh network with ultrasonic sounds. Deshotels
[9] expanded this method to mobile devices. All of these
techniques only work at short ranges because either the device
sound must be captured directly or microphones must capture
the transmitted ultrasonic signal. Our goal is not to explore
new audio covert channels but to investigate the threat posed
by such channels when VAs are in the vicinity of computers.
Furthermore, we address the problem of exfiltration of data
via audio to remote computers.
Data transfer with acoustic signals has been explored in the
past [20], [22], [23], [26]. Madhavapeddy et al. [23] presented
the use of Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF) signaling for
such transfer to send short messages between devices over the
phone channel. A bit rate of 20 bit/second with DTMF across
a 100-inch distance was demonstrated. Nandakumar et al. [26]
realized an acoustics-based near field communication (NFC)
system on mobile phones. It used orthogonal frequency divi-
sion multiplexing (OFDM) with subcarriers selected in range
0–22 kHz to send data. Our proposed system uses DTMF
signaling to encode data but we explore its transmission over
a telephony channel to attacker controlled remote systems via
a VA.
In this paper, we assume that data is exfiltrated from a
compromised computer that is close to a VA. The computer
is compromised by infecting it with some malware. There
is considerable research in the area of malware infection,
detection and remediation (see survey papers such as [7], [11]).
One or more of the infection vectors can be used by malicious
actors to infect machines that store sensitive data. We do not
discuss details of how such infections are accomplished but
focus on how the malware can utilize the speaker on the
infected machine and a VA to exfiltrate sensitive data.
III. THREAT MODEL
We explore attacks in which an attacker’s goal is to locate
computers in home or office settings that store sensitive data
and then exfiltrate such data via nearby VAs. To launch such an
attack at scale, the attacker must be able to infect large number
of computers and take control of them via malware that can be
used to issue commands to VAs. Malware infection of victim
computers can be accomplished using a number of techniques,
including compromised webpages, spam email clicks, social
engineering or by exploiting software vulnerabilities. Once a
computer is under control of the malware, the malware must
issue a series of audio commands via available device speakers
to activate a nearby VA. Once this is done, it plays audio via
computer speakers that encodes the data and the data then is
transmitted to an attacker controlled system.
Although we assume that the attacker is able to compromise
computers via tricking users, we do not require that the
attacker is able to overcome host or network defenses that are
deployed to protect transfer of sensitive data to unauthorized
hosts. Instead, by using computer speakers and VAs, an
alternate path is set up to exfiltrate data. Since the data is
encoded as audio, one question is if a human, who is in the
vicinity of the infected computer or VA, will hear such audio
and be alarmed. Although past research has demonstrated
that commands to VAs can be hidden or be made inaudible
(this is possible through adversarial example attacks [5], [6],
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[39] or audio processing [1], [32], [40]), it is not known
if this can be done with audio that encodes arbitrary data
which is played over speakers that are available on common
computers. Furthermore, we need to encode data in audio that
can be transmitted with high accuracy over a voice phone call
connection.
A person who hears sound coming from a computer will
become suspicious when the sound is due to audio encoded
exfiltration of data. Ideally, we can encode the data in audio
frequencies that are inaudible to humans using modulation
with an ultrasonic carrier but as discussed earlier, this is
not possible with ordinary computer speakers. Instead, we
consider a threat model that seeks to achieve near inaudibility
based on the following observation. Most adults cannot hear
high frequencies even when they are close to the sound source.
For example, an average adult can only hear frequencies below
16 kHz due to natural hearing loss with age. As shown in
audiograms that capture normal human hearing, the highest
frequency sound that can be noticed is even lower (e.g., less
than 10 kHz) when the sound volume is at the level of a
normal conversation or lower [35]. We explore if data can
be exfiltrated stealthily when the audio encoding the data is
modulated with a very high frequency carrier (over 15 kHz). In
fact, as expected, we did find a tradeoff between inaudibility
and the accuracy with which the audio can be transmitted
via computer speakers. We can increase the carrier frequency
to 20 kHz to make it inaudible to nearly everyone at lower
transmission accuracy or we can choose a frequency that most
people would not hear to increase accuracy. We report results
of experiments that explore this tradeoff and measure the
bandwidth of the audio data transfer channel with various high
frequency modulation carriers.This helps us understand data
transfer rates that could be achieved with various levels of
inaudibility for humans who may be close to the computer.
IV. DATA TRANSMISSION CHANNEL CHARACTERIZATION
Our goal is to explore if the audio channel that can be setup
between a computer and a nearby VA can be leveraged for
transmitting data to an attacker controlled remote computer.
We use the phone call functionality provided by VAs like Ama-
zon Echo to transmit data to such a remote host. To be able to
do this, we need to better understand the characteristics of this
transmission channel between the source and target computers.
As shown in Figure 1, data is first encoded in an audio file at
a compromised source host and this audio is modulated with
a high frequency sound carrier to make it less noticeable to a
user who may be close to the source computer or the VA. This
modulated audio is then transmitted via the computer speaker
and received by VA’s microphones. Environmental noise could
be mixed with the computer transmitted audio. Once the VA
captures the audio, a phone call is used to transmit the data to
the remote host. Such a call relies on a Voice-Over-IP (VoIP)
channel to the cloud and then a gateway that sends the voice
over a telecommunications network to the end system where
the voice is recorded (a Google Voice phone number is used
in our case).
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Fig. 2. Sound level distribution of received audio at various frequencies. To
describe signal strength in this paper, we use dB Full Scale (dBFS), which is
based on the ratio of the digital signal level to the maximum possible signal
level [24]. The values on this scale are different from the air pressure based
dB scale that is used to describe sound loudness.
The phone channel behavior depends on codecs and sam-
pling rates, protocols used for transmitting the audio packets,
and other factors such as noise cancellation and packet loss
concealment. Although information about audio codecs and
transport protocols is available, characterization of the end-to-
end transmission channel that starts with a computer speaker
and ends with the called phone number is challenging because
we have no information about telecommunication carriers and
gateways that are involved in supporting a call. Due to this,
we take a blackbox empirical analysis approach to study this
channel to understand its characteristics that are relevant to
transmission of data with audio. In particular, we measure
the frequency response of the channel, its transport protocol
behavior, and VA features that handle voice capture depending
on energy level of the audio source and microphone response
to modulation carrier frequencies.
As mentioned earlier, in our experiments, we chose Amazon
Echo Plus as the VA because it can be made to dial a phone
number directly by saying, Alexa, call (123)-456-789. Thus, it
can reach a phone number from any personal Echo. We place
the Echo Plus close to a MacBook Pro, playing audio through
its speakers. The other endpoint of the phone call channel
is a Google Voice number. We record calls coming to the
Google Voice number. The audio recordings are downloaded
and data is reconstructed from these recordings. Unlike some
of the earlier attacks that have been reported on VAs, in our
setup a remote attacker can easily get a Google Voice number
and download call recordings coming to it. Thus, data can be
exfiltrated over the audio channel enabled by the VA without
being in physical proximity of the targeted computer and VA.
A. Phone Call Channel Frequency Response
Our data transmission relies on a phone call channel, which
is typically used to transmit human voice over the frequency
range of 300 to 3400 Hz [30]. To measure if our transmission
channel has a similar frequency range, we play a frequency
scan audio and measure the sound level of received audio. In
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Figure 2, the received sound level goes above -60 dB after
about 260 Hz, and drops below -60 dB at 3400 Hz, which
provides good quality for normal phone call that carries the
audio of people talking. While the phone call channel provides
limited sound level at lower frequency, it drops sharply after
3000 Hz, and becomes nearly undetectable after 4000 Hz.
Thus, for transmitting data as audio, we must operate within
the voiceband (300–3400 Hz).
In theory, the bit rate for data transfer over the phone
channel can reach 33600 bit per second [31], but only through
a well designed modem. However, we rely on devices that
support normal phone calls. The audio is played out by the
speakers on a laptop and captured by microphones on Echo
Plus over the air. This audio is then transmitted via a phone
channel after encoding it with voice codecs. Also, the quality
of the audio transmitted by the computer speakers could be
degraded with environmental noise which can further reduce
the bandwidth. Thus, the bit rate that our phone call channel
can support for data transfer is significantly lower. Although
this would make bulk data transfer challenging, passwords,
keys, bank account or social security numbers and other
limited size data can be transmitted over such a channel.
B. Packet Loss
VoIP systems often choose the user datagram protocol
(UDP) because it provides better call experience and loss of
occasional packets can be handled without negative impact
on call quality (e.g., packet concealment techniques have
been developed to deal with packet loss). However, if we
encode data in audio, packet loss could impact accuracy of
data transmission. We ran experiments to see if we observe
packet losses in the data transmission channel used by us.
Figure 3 shows 6 seconds of audio transmitted through our
phone call channel. We do observe random packet drops which
correspond to the energy level drops in the audio signal. Packet
loss may be due to a weak network connection, congestion etc.
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Fig. 3. Packet Loss Shown as Energy Drop.
In case of packet loss, the VoIP system may employ
techniques like packet loss concealment and such modified
audio packets will introduce errors in the decoded data. Since
we only check audio after it is recorded at the receiving end,
the presence of multiple packet losses could indicate that the
data sent in the audio may not be recoverable. Although correct
and complete data exfiltration is not achieved in this case, the
reconstructed data may provide partial information about the
Fig. 4. Microphones on Amazon Echo Plus in Green Circles. There are six
S1053 0090 V6 Microphones on the perimeter and one in the center of the
board [17].
transmitted secret. We will address how data transfer accuracy
can be improved in the presence of noise and packet loss in
Section V.
C. Voice Assistant Audio Processing Features
VAs are built for taking people’s commands and responding
to them. A good quality recording is essential for correct
understanding of commands and also for providing a high
quality voice call to the other end of phone call channel. Unlike
usual cellphones which are only equipped with microphones
on the top and bottom, a VA can utilize multiple microphones
as a microphone array. In Figure 4, there are seven micro-
phones in the top board of Amazon Echo Plus, six on the
perimeter and one in the center. A microphone array can help
the VA determine the direction of incoming voice based on
the difference in the arrival times at each microphone. When
audio signals come from many directions, Echo Plus has its
own algorithm to distinguish human voice from background
noise and then focus in the direction of human voice, resulting
in cancellation of noise. In our experiments, we can observe
two interesting adjustments Echo Plus applies to its audio
recordings.
• Amazon Echo Plus tends to adjust the volume to a
moderate level as time goes. From Figure 5a, while
white noise sound level played from laptop is stable,
the maximum sound level of the recording is lowered
automatically by the device. This may be an adjustment
scheme in case of a sudden burst of sound.
• The sound must reach a certain level to get the attention
of Amazon Echo. We explore this by conducting an
experiment that starts by transmitting audio with no noise
at first and then same audio is played with noise. This
is repeated to see the activation of the microphones.
In Figure 5b, we first show the recorded audio with
no noise followed by including the noise. At first, we
play our encoded audio from 100 inches away while
there is no noise playing. The sound level is too low
to catch the attention of Amazon Echo Plus. When we
play a loud noise with the same encoded audio, the
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Fig. 5. The Built-in Audio Processing of Amazon Echo Plus.
combined sound energy level reaches the threshold and
the microphones are activated. We decode the recorded
audios which encode the same message. In the case when
there is no noise, we could not reconstruct the message. In
contrast, the audio with the noise has most of information
in it. Although somewhat surprising, this observation is
consistent with past research results that the VA is able
to understand degraded quality voice commands that are
not intelligible for humans.
For call audio recorded at the receiving end, we also
found that Amazon Echo Plus does not filter out noise from
the transmitted audio which was the case when we directly
recorded the audio on a cellphone.
Based on our characterization of the data transmission
channel and the VA from the above experiments, we explore
an approach that can help us demonstrate that data can be
exfiltrated from a compromised computer via a phone call
initiated by an infected computer. Our goal is to achieve high
accuracy while making the sound as unnoticeable as possible.
We use modulation with a very high frequency carrier to make
the sound inaudible and rely on VA microphone nonlinearity
for automatic demodulation. We discuss how this can be done
next.
D. Voice Assistant Microphone Response to Very High Fre-
quency Sound
Very High Frequency Sound (VHFS) is the sound in fre-
quency range 13.5–20 kHz [13]. We know that sound beyond
20 kHz, referred to as ultrasound, is inaudible to humans.
In [40], Zhang et al. took advantage of ultrasound modulation
and the nonlinearity of microphones to send inaudible com-
mands to VAs. They used high quality speakers to transmit
ultrasound frequencies. Since our threat model assumes a
remote attacker, we only assume speakers that are available in
PCs or laptops. While these normal speakers cannot produce
ultrasound at a significant energy level, they can generate loud
VHFS. If we can modulate the tones with carrier frequency
beyond 15 kHz, which is difficult to hear for most adults [8],
the modulated sound will likely not raise an alert when people
are nearby the computer. Our experiments revealed this to
be the case when a person is not right next to the computer
speakers.
The VHFS is captured by the voice assistant microphones.
The inherent nonlinearity of these microphones results in
demodulation which can be modeled as follows [40]:
sout(t) = Asin(t) +Bs
2
in(t), (1)
where sin(t) is the input signal, sout(t) is the output signal,
and A and B are gains for corresponding terms.
In our scheme, a two-frequency tone represents a 6-bit
binary string (see Section V).We can formulate the original
signal as:
m(t) = sin(2pif1t) + sin(2pif2t), (2)
where f1 and f2 are the two frequencies. Let the carrier
frequency to be fc >> 3400 Hz. We modulate m(t) on fc.
Amplitude modulation gives us:
y(t) = [1 + sin(2pif1t) + sin(2pif2t)] sin(2pifct). (3)
By expanding (3) and using trigonometric identities, we get
five different frequency components: fc, (fc − f1), (fc − f2),
(fc + f1) and (fc + f2). To keep the signal wave beyond
frequency fc for inaudibility, we filter out (fc−f1) and (fc−
f2). The modulated signal is then sent via the speaker.
ys(t) = sin(2pifct)−
1
2
cos[2pi(fc+f1)t]−
1
2
cos[2pi(fc+f2)t].
(4)
After recording by the microphones, which means applying
(1) to (4), we will get f1, (f1 − f2) and f2, but also other
unwanted frequencies such as 2fc, 2(fc + f1), (2fc + f1),
etc. All these high frequencies are automatically filtered out
while the recording is sent through the phone call channel
with a frequency upper bound of 3400 Hz. We only have f1,
(f1 − f2) and f2 components remaining, with coefficients 1,
1/2 and 1, respectively.
In Figure 6, we use a carrier frequency fc = 15 kHz. The
appearance of f1, (f1−f2) and f2 shows that the microphones
on Amazon Echo Plus do have nonlinearity. We exploit this for
decoding data from the audio that is recorded at the receiving
end of the phone channel.
V. METHODOLOGY
Based on our characterization of the data transmission
channel, we explore how an attacker who has control of a
computer can exfiltrate data stored on it to a remote system
under its control. Since data is encoded in audio, the attacker
wants to achieve high accuracy even in the presence of some
noise and wants the transfer to complete as quickly as possible.
Although several techniques exist for encoding digital data
into audio, we focus on Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency Signaling
(DTMF) because the audio must be transmitted over a phone
6
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Fig. 6. Evaluation of the nonlinearity effect. Frequency domain plots for
the original audio and recorded audio. In the recoding, f1 and f2 were
demodulated out while frequencies beyond about 4000 Hz was filtered out.
channel. Also, based on our observations, packet losses and
other noise could lead to errors in the received audio. To
increase data transmission accuracy, we need to use encoding
that could help correct certain class of errors. Finally, to make
the transfer stealthy, we modulate the audio that encodes data
using a very high frequency carrier so the audio transmission
from a computer speaker to the VA is less likely to be noticed
by humans. We utilize previously investigated techniques to
address data encoding into audio, error handling and high-
frequency modulation to demonstrate the feasibility of a
stealthy data exfiltration channel to a remote host via a VA.
First, we provide a brief overview of these in this section.
A. Preliminaries
We first introduce DTMF, which we use for transmitting
voice encoded data through a phone call channel, and explain
how we choose the DTMF frequency groups in our method to
increase data transfer rate. We then discuss modulation with
a very high frequency carrier in order to make the sound
unnoticeable to most humans.
1) Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency Signaling: DTMF was in-
troduced in [2] over 50 years ago and is also called “Touch
Tone”. DTMF is specially designed for transmitting digit
signals through a voice call. Since it is difficult to protect
single-frequency tones from perturbation of speech and back-
ground noise, DTMF uses a set of 16 dual-frequency tones,
representing 10 decimal digits and other buttons on a phone.
The 16 tones are formed by a so-called “four-by-four” code:
each tone is made up of one high frequency from high group
and one low frequency from low group as shown in Table I.
Since speech often involves lower harmonics, in order to
distinguish DTMF tone frequencies from speech, Battista et
al. [2] carefully chose them to avoid frequencies in one
group harmonically relating to those in the other group. Also,
frequencies used in DTMF totally fall within the voiceband
range, 300 Hz to 3400 Hz, as we discussed in Section IV-A,
to confine them to the transmission band of the telephony
channel. DTMF is still widely used for customer services,
remote guest door controlling, etc. It is natural and reliable
to leverage DTMF for data transmission in our setting that
includes a VA being able to make a call.
To recover the frequencies used in a tone on receiver side,
we make use of the Goertzel algorithm. It is an efficient
TABLE I
HIGH GROUP AND LOW GROUP OF TONE FREQUENCIES.
High Group (Hz) Low Group (Hz)
1209 697
1336 770
1477 852
1633 941
algorithm that can calculate the signal strength at chosen fre-
quencies, unlike fast Fourier transform (FFT), which calculates
all frequency components [27].
2) Choosing DTMF Frequencies to Increase Data Transfer
Rate: Commonly used DTMF only makes use of 4 low
frequencies and 4 high frequencies, as shown in Table I, to
form 16 tones. Adjacent frequencies in each group have a
ratio of 21/19. Although these frequency groups are sufficient
to transmit 16 symbols on a phone, more tones are needed
for our data transmission. Another problem we found is that
background noise includes frequencies that are close to the
low frequencies shown in Table I. We choose different DTMF
frequencies to address both of these problems.
To increase the number of bits that can be sent in a single
tone, we use two expanded frequency groups with 8 frequen-
cies in each group to form 64 tones. A straightforward way to
form these groups is to expand the original frequency groups
in Table I. However, since the high-frequency modulation
we plan to use produces an additional difference frequency
(f1 − f2), a simple expansion while maintaining the desired
ratio between consecutive frequencies will produce a lot of
collisions between the DTMF and difference frequencies. A
collision occurs when two frequencies are very close and
the energy level of one could exceed the other one due to
noise and leakage due to nonlinearity. This will result in
the Goertzel algorithm returning an incorrect tone frequency
since it chooses the two frequencies in a tone that have the
highest energy levels in each group. For example, if we choose
f1 = fA from Group A, and f2 = fB from Group B, the
resulting difference frequency (f1 − f2) will still be in the
voiceband range and could collide with one of the other DTMF
frequencies.
We reduce the likelihood of collisions between tone and
difference frequencies by choosing tone frequencies f1 and
f2 as follows. We set f1 = fA + fB and f2 = fA, which
results in audio in a tone with frequencies (fA + fB) and fA.
This tone audio is modulated with a carrier and transmitted
via a speaker. The voice assistant microphone will reintroduce
frequencies (fA + fB), fA and difference frequency fB due
to its nonlinearity prior to transmission of this audio over the
phone channel. A positive side effect of this is that collisions
due to the additional higher frequency (fA + fB) in the
recording at the destination will be minimized because in most
cases, it will be outside of the voiceband and get filtered out
by the phone channel which acts as a low pass filter. Based on
these insights, we decided to use two groups of frequencies
that satisfy the following constraints:
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1) All frequencies are within 300 Hz to 3400 Hz range.
2) In each group, two adjacent frequencies have a ratio of
21/19.
3) Any two frequencies chosen from the two groups, fA
from one group and fB from the other group, are
separated by a threshold. Also, their sum, (fA + fB),
is also separated by that threshold from any chosen
frequencies.
The smallest gap between any pair of frequencies in the
original DTMF groups is 73 Hz. However, setting the threshold
to 73 Hz, 72 Hz and 71 Hz gives no results that satisfy the
above constraints. When we set the threshold to 70 Hz, we
obtain the frequencies shown in Table II that satisfy these
constraints. These 16 frequencies form the two groups that
allow us to produce 8× 8 = 64 tones, and each tone can thus
encode 6 bits.
The choice of frequencies in the two groups is also impacted
by another factor. Although the new DTMF frequencies are
a good fit for data exfiltration in our channel, we show in
Section V-C that noise is the main source of errors when
we transfer data with DTMF tones. The background noise
spectrums in a normal office and home setting are shown in
Figure 7. We can see that in the lab, the noise energy mostly
distributes at lower frequencies below 600 Hz, while at home,
the noise tends to distribute more randomly across the voice-
band. Also, while high frequencies (above 500 Hz) tend to
be very directional, lower frequencies can more easily spread
and reflect in a room, resulting in increased low frequency
noise in our recorded audios [28]. Based on these observations,
the lowest frequencies chosen by us can avoid most of the
interference coming from noise. Although the ranges of the
two groups have considerable overlap, this does not influence
our decoding for DTMF tones, since the frequencies in the two
groups are separated by at least 70 Hz, and the two groups
are detected separately by the Goertzel algorithm. The two
new frequency groups also satisfy the criteria for avoiding
harmonics lower than sixth as in [2]. Furthermore, it will avoid
most collisions when we use high-frequency modulation to the
tone audio before transmitting it over the computer speaker.
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Fig. 7. Noise Spectrum at Home and a Lab.
The groups of new DTMF frequencies are shown in Table II.
With expanded groups, we have 8 × 8 = 64 DTMF tones.
Thus, each tone can now represent 6 binary bits, increasing
the transfer bandwidth by 50% compared with the commonly
used DTMF tones.
TABLE II
EXPANDED DTMF FREQUENCIES.
Group A (Hz) Group B (Hz)
1624 1402
1794 1549
1982 1712
2190 1892
2420 2091
2674 2311
2955 2554
3266 2822
B. Data to Audio Encoding/Decoding
To transmit data, we must first convert the data that is to
be transmitted to an audio file. The encoding method used
should be such that the encoded audio can be transmitted via
the computer speaker, received by a VA and then sent via a
phone channel.
1) Converting Binary Data to DTMF Tone Audio: We now
describe the process that starts from a data file that stores
arbitrary data and outputs an audio file that can be played
through the computer speaker. Binary values can be mapped
to DTMF tone sequences in a straightforward manner. The
DTMF generator generates one tone for every log
2
(n) bits,
where n is the number of tones we are using. In widely
used DTMF systems, n = 16, so a tone can represent 4
bits. However, in our expanded DTMF, n = 64, allowing one
tone to represent 6 binary bits. As discussed in Section IV,
our characterization of the data transfer channel used by VAs
demonstrates the need for handling transmission errors that
could arise due to noise or other factors like packet losses. We
develop an encoding scheme that allows us to handle certain
class of transmission errors.
As shown in Figure 8, we first convert the characters in a
file we are sending to their corresponding ASCII binary codes.
Thus, one character can be represented with 8 bits. For error
correction, we first use the Golay code for encoding these bits
before generating tones from them. The choice of this code is
motivated by our desire to correct certain errors that can occur
during transmission (see Section V-C).
C. Error Correction
We develop our error correction scheme by first exploring
the source of errors in the received audio. Such errors occur
because the audio of a tone is sufficiently perturbed such
that a frequency that does not belong to the tone has higher
energy level than the tone frequencies. In our experimental
setting, there are two main sources of errors: Noise and
the unwanted frequencies introduced by demodulation. We
employ mitigation methods for each of them by using an error
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TABLE III
TWO DIMENSIONALGRAY CODE ENCODING DTMF
Group A (Hz) 1624 1794 1982 2190 2420 2674 2955 3266
Group B (Hz) Gray Code 000 001 011 010 110 111 101 100
1402 000 000 000 001 000 011 000 010 000 110 000 111 000 101 000 100 000
1549 001 000 001 001 001 011 001 010 001 110 001 111 001 101 001 100 001
1712 011 000 011 001 011 011 011 010 011 110 011 111 011 101 011 100 011
1892 010 000 010 001 010 011 010 010 010 110 010 111 010 101 010 100 010
2091 110 000 110 001 110 011 110 010 110 110 110 111 110 101 110 100 110
2311 111 000 111 001 111 011 111 010 111 110 111 111 111 101 111 100 111
2554 101 000 101 001 101 011 101 010 101 110 101 111 101 101 101 100 101
2822 100 000 100 001 100 011 100 010 100 110 100 111 100 101 100 100 100
Fig. 8. Encoding Process. One 24-bit Golay code word is represented by 4
DTMF tones.
correction code, The Golay Code allows us to correct a certain
set of errors.
1) Errors from Noise: We empirically studied how such
errors arise and found that the main reason is the background
noise. In Figure 9, the original tone consists of two frequen-
cies, 1549 Hz and 3266 Hz. However in its recorded audio, a
number of new frequencies appear due to background noise.
In particular, the frequency 1402 Hz with higher energy level
takes the place of original 1549 Hz, resulting in a bit flip
in decoding. We did find that the rate of such errors can be
reduced by using a lower carrier frequency or by using longer
tones, which is a tradeoff between stealthiness and speed.
We also noticed that the impact of noise is such that errors
that lead to bit flips are due to increased energy level of DTMF
frequencies in adjacent tones (an adjacent tone encodes a bit
string that differs in a single bit) caused by spectral leakage
after Fourier transform. This can be seen from Figure 9 where
we see that both in the transmitted and received audios, the
energy of each DTMF frequency is distributed around this
frequency. Thus, when the tone audio suffers additive noise,
there is a higher probability that the adjacent frequencies
energy exceeds the energy level of the tone frequency. Since
decoding is based on energy levels of the tone frequencies,
this will lead to a bit flip because an adjacent but incorrect
frequency is detected.
We use a two dimensional Gray code to encode data to
DTMF frequencies. Gray code is a well-known binary code
in which codes for two successive values differ only in one
bit. We can see in Table III that DTMF tones form a two
1549 Hz
3266 Hz
1402 Hz
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Fig. 9. Spectrum of Original Audio and Recorded Audio. We take a 0.05s
tone from our experiment when the distance is 50 inch and carrier frequency
is 18 kHz. Frequency 1549 Hz was decoded as 1402 Hz, due to frequency
leakage and noise.
dimensional matrix constructed from two frequency groups.
Since each tone T can have four different adjacent tones, each
of which has one frequency different from T , we can apply
the idea of Gray code to this matrix. First, with 8 frequencies,
each frequency can be represented with a 3-bit Gray code. We
can then combine two 3-bit codes together, with the Group A
frequency bits at left and Group B frequency bits at right as
in Table III. This results in a DTMF tone binary code matrix
that satisfies the property that adjacent tones differ only in one
bit. We can write this table as a function with 6 binary bits as
input and corresponding frequencies as output .
T (Bi) = (FA, FB),
where Bi is the ith 6-bit input binary string, FA is the Group A
frequency of the DTMF tone and FB is the Group B frequency.
When decoding the message, the function is the inverse of T :
S(FA, FB) = T
−1(FA, FB).
For example, if we are sending binary string B1 = 001010,
corresponding DTMF tone T1 = (1794, 1892) will be sent
through the phone call channel. If noise is added to the tone
audio, adjacent tone frequencies could have higher energy
levels. If the received tone is T
′
1
= (1624, 1712), the decoding
function will produce the binary string B
′
1
= S(T
′
1
) = 000011.
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We can see that B1 and B
′
1
have only 2 bits difference when
noise impacts both tone frequencies.
2) Errors from Demodulation: We modulate the tone audio
with carrier frequencies 15 kHz, 18 kHz or 20 kHz to achieve
stealthy transfer that is less likely to be noticed by a person
who may be in the vicinity of the computer. Due to the
nonlinearity of voice assistant microphones, the modulated
signal will get naturally demodulated before it goes to the
phone channel. Because of the voiceband range (300–3400
Hz) of the phone call channel, the high frequency components
that are close to the carrier frequency will be removed, which
gives us the original signal. In Section IV-D, we discover that
the modulated sound will generate f1, f2 and an unwanted
frequency, (f1 − f2). Since we choose f1 = fA + fB and
f2 = fA, it produces (fA + fB), fA and fB in the recording.
Thus, there are only 6 possible values of the additional
frequency (fA+ fB) that lie in voiceband and will be present
in the recording.
3) Golay Code: We use Golay Code for error correction. It
can correct at most 3 bits errors in a 24-bit string [36]. Golay
code comes with an encoder E() and a decoder D(). A 12-bit
binary string message,M , will be encoded into a 24-bit Golay
code word, W = E(M). Since one DTMF tone can represent
6 bits of binary strings, one Golay code word is transmitted
by 4 tones.
After receiving the code, every 4 tones will be decoded into
one Golay code word, W
′
, which may have several flipped
bits compared with the original word W . We can then get the
message M
′
= D(W
′
). If the flipped bits are less or equal to
three, M
′
= M .
D. Data Exfiltration
We consider the scenario in which an attacker has success-
fully compromised a computer and wants to exfiltrate sensitive
data that is available at the computer. To bypass network
defenses, malware on the compromised computer uses a VA
and the phone channel to transmit data to the attacker. To
accomplish this, the malware must first locate the data and
convert it to an audio file. This is done using DTMF tones
and the encoding scheme described by us. Once this is done,
the tone audio is modulated with a carrier frequency chosen
to make its transfer via a computer stealthy. These steps have
to be completed before transmission can begin by playing the
audio file via the computer speakers.
To begin data transfer, first the VA must be given a com-
mand to make a phone call to a phone number chosen by the
attacker. Such an activation command can be hidden and made
unnoticeable as demonstrated by previous research [1], [5],
[6], [32], [39], [40]. After the activation, desired audio will be
played by the computer. The VA transmits this audio over the
phone call and it is recorded at the receiving end of the call. To
recover the transferred data, prior to decoding, the audio in the
recording is first aligned. This can be accomplished by adding
a prefix to the audio. We then feed the audio to the Goertzel
Algorithm to find out frequencies in each tone. Based on the
frequencies found, a binary representation is generated. We
use such representation as a sequence of 24-bit Golay code
words, which are then decoded. Finally, the decoded binary
data is converted back to characters in the original file, as
shown in Figure 10.
Fig. 10. Decoding Process. As shown in Figure 8, the first tone in the audio
sent was (2674, 1402) and the last was (2420, 1402). They got decoded to
(2955, 1402) and (2420, 1712), but the binary code is able to error correct
this and decode the sent value correctly.
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate the efficacy of the data exfiltration scheme de-
veloped by us, we implemented a proof-of-concept prototype
system. This system allowed us to demonstrate the feasibility
of data exfiltration via a VA and the phone channel, and we
also used it to experimentally assess how accurately data can
be transmitted and what transfer rates can be achieved. In
particular, we want to study the factors that impact error rates
(e.g., incorrect characters in messages received in the phone
recording at a phone number to which a call is made by
the VA). The transfer accuracy is impacted by a number of
parameters, some of which could be under the control of the
attacker. Our experiments allowed us to study the impact of
the following key parameters.
1) Tone length: Tone length describes the time duration for
which a single tone is played. Shorter tones lead to faster
data transfer but could also increase errors due to signal
leakage across tones.
2) Distance between computer and VA: The computer from
which data is exfiltrated could be several feets away
from the VA. Increased distance allows greater flexibility
for attacker but could increase transmission error rates
because of reduced energy level of the audio signal that
will be received at the VA.
3) Carrier frequencies: We modulate DTMF tone audio
with a carrier frequency to achieve stealthiness. Higher
carrier frequencies, which are closer to 20 kHz, are
inaudible to almost all people and would not raise an
alert. However, higher frequencies introduce more errors
because they suffer higher attenuation with distance.
We conduct experiments to explore the stealthiness and
transmission accuracy tradeoffs.
4) Background noise: We saw that additive background
noise can increase the energy level of a frequency that is
different than the tone frequencies. This leads to errors
reducing accuracy.
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Fig. 11. Transmission Accuracy Results
We report results of experiments that allowed us to explore
the tradeoffs introduced by these parameters. We first describe
the experimental setup and then present the results.
A. Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we use an Amazon Echo Plus to dial
the attacker controlled phone number. Once the call is made,
it can be recorded or allowed to go directly to voicemail. We
give the command to make the phone call and play carrier
modulated audio after it is set up from a Macbook Pro 15”
2018 at 100% volume. The audio goes over the air to Echo
which is placed at various distances. It is then transmitted
through the phone call channel and recorded using Google
Voice. The attacker phone number is a Google Voice number,
which allows voicemail or call recording to be downloaded
from its website. When adding background sound, we play a
night ambient noise from an iPhone 6 at 100% volume at 5
inches away from the Amazon Echo Plus.
We change the tone length from 50 ms to 12 ms to explore
speed of transmission. For measuring the possible attack range,
the distance between the computer and the Echo varies from 0
inch to 100 inches. Also, different carrier frequencies between
15 kHz and 20 kHz to explore the tradeoff between stealthiness
and accuracy. The influence of the presence of background
sound is studied as well.
B. Results
We measure transmission accuracy under various settings
of the parameters described above. If n bits are transmitted
and m of those bits are received correctly, percent accuracy is
defined asm/n×100. Since we use 8 bits to encode characters,
we also consider the number of characters that are received in
error. We plot accuracy when different parameters are varied.
Tone Length: In Figure 11a, we plot accuracy as it varies with
tone length when various carrier frequencies are used to make
the audio transmission less noticeable. As the tone length in-
creases, the accuracy grows. This can be explained as follows.
First, if the tone is too short, the adjacent tones will interfere
with each other due to signal distortions introduced by the
speaker and microphone; second, a shorter tone will result
in lower amount of accumulated energy level for a frequency
compared with noise, leading to incorrect decoding. When the
tone length is longer than 40 ms, the accuracies are all above
90% except for 20 kHz modulation at 25 inch distance. In this
case, accuracy is lower as there are usually about 1/4 character
errors after error correction. When increasing the modulation
frequency, we can see that the accuracy drops drastically when
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tone length is less than 20 ms. If we increase the tone length to
50 ms, we get closer to 90% accuracy even with 20 kHz carrier
frequency for modulation and 25 inches distance between the
computer and the VA. As can be seen, lines corresponding to
carrier frequencies 15 kHz and 18 kHz go up to about 99%
with either distance. This demonstrates the tradeoff between
stealthiness and transmission accuracy.
If the VA is very close to the computer, data can be
transmitted with high accuracy. We can also see the number
of characters that are received in error when the distance is 0
inch in Figure 11d. No characters are received in error when
the tone length is 50 ms. From these experiments, we find that
50 ms tone length offers good accuracy and we use this value
in all other experiments.
If the tone length is 50 ms and we leave a 50 ms gap
between adjacent tones, there will be 10 tones/second. Each
tone represents 6 binary bits, then the bit rate is 60 bits/second
when no error correction is done. The highest bit rate is
reached when the tone length is 12 ms, that is, a bit rate of
250 bits/second is achieved but many characters are received
in error. Errors will be problematic when sensitive data such as
passwords or social security numbers are exfiltrated. In case
of normal text, it may be possible to correct the erroneous
characters but we do not explore this here.
Distance: We varied the distance from 0 inch, where Echo
is right in front of the laptop computer to 100 inches, where
Echo is placed at one side of a bedroom while the laptop
is at the other side. As expected, in Figure 11e, the accuracy
worsens as we increase the distance between the Echo and the
laptop. When modulating with 15 kHz and 18 kHz carrier, the
accuracies are all above 90% even at 100 inches. The errors are
about 1/8 at 100 inches distance as can be seen in Figure 11f.
While 20 kHz modulation can reach 100% accuracy at 0 inch
without adding noise and nearly 90% with noise playing, the
accuracy goes down quickly as distance grows. Also, we can
see that the night ambience noise is introducing errors in our
received bits.
Modulation Frequency:We discuss the impact of modulation
frequency when the tone length is fixed to 50 ms. When
the frequency is 15 kHz in Figure 11e, the accuracies at all
distance are all close to 100%, even when the distance is 100
inches. When we increase the frequency to 18 kHz, as shown
in in Figure 11e, the accuracy is still above 89% even at 100
inches distance. Only when the frequency reaches 20 kHz, the
accuracy drops quickly after 0 inch. From these experiments,
with an 18 kHz carrier, we can obtain good accuracy while the
audio being nearly unnoticeable. If the distance is too far to
obtain acceptable accuracy, the carrier only needs to be set to
15 kHz. With 15 kHz carrier, close to 100% accuracy can be
achieved, while it does leak some noticeable frequencies. In
this case, we could only hear some faint sounds when the audio
was played when the our ear was right next to the computer
speaker. No noticeable sounds were heard a few feet away
from the computer. This is consistent with the past research
that shows that frequencies above 15 kHz can only be heard
when the sound volume is high [35].
Noise: As expected, the introduction of noise close to the
VA has a negative impact on data transmission. As can be
seen in Figure 11e, introduction of night ambient noise has
significant impact on the transmission accuracy when 18 or 20
kHz carrier frequencies are used. In contrast, minimal impact
is observed for 15 kHz carrier even when the distance between
the computer and the VA is several feet.
Error Correction: We performed data decoding both with
and without error correction. When the tone length is fixed to
50 ms, no noise is added, and distance is varied from from 0
inch to 100 inches, the results are shown in Figure 11b. When
distance is 0 inch, there are no error in characters decoded
from received audio. However, when distance is increased to
25 inches, there are errors due to bit flips. All of these errors
can be handled by error correction. We also varied the tone
length from 12 ms to 50 ms, with no added noise, fixing the
distance at 0 inch. As shown in Figure 11c, when tone length is
12 ms, too many bit flips lead to errors both when correction is
and is not performed. In contrast, tone length of 16 ms shows
about 50% fewer errors with error correction. There are no
errors when tone length is 50 ms and accuracy is nearly 100%
in both cases. Since errors do occur at certain distances and
tone lengths, we use error correction despite the fact that it
halves the transfer rate.
Summary: Our experiments demonstrate the feasibility of
data exfiltration via a VA even when it is several feet away
from a compromised computer. This can be done even when
humans are close to the computer or VA because most people
are unable to hear frequencies higher than 15 kHz. Based on
our results, we can see that when error correction is used, 9000
bits can be transmitted by a five minute phone call to a remote
endpoint with very high accuracy. This can be done when a 18
kHz carrier is used to make the audio completely unnoticeable
and the distance between the computer and the VA is over six
feet. As expected, noise and distance both reduce the accuracy
of transmission.
VII. DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that infected computers in the vicin-
ity of VAs can bypass network defenses by using a VA
mediated phone call to leak data. In this section, we briefly
discuss possible defenses and their efficacy. We also discuss
some limitations of the system developed by us.
A. Defenses
Phone calls typically are made by users whereas data exfil-
tration by a VA requires the audio to originate from a computer
speaker. For commands to VAs, liveness detection techniques
have been developed. For example, it is demonstrated in [4]
that certain characteristic frequencies are present in audio that
comes from a speaker which are not present when an audio
source is a live person. These frequencies are low (< 200 Hz)
and will not be transmitted by the telephony channel. Hence,
defense based on such frequency detection has to be deployed
at the VA. Furthermore, there may be legitimate cases when
a call source is a computer. For example, a conferencing
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application running on a computer may command a VA to
reach certain participants by making a phone call. Also, future
AI based applications running on a computer may use VAs in
a conversation with remote parties that are reached via the
phone (e.g., Google Duplex [14]). Again, a liveness detection
defense cannot always be used.
Defenses against malware or compromised applications that
abuse computer speakers can also be deployed on the computer
where sensitive data is stored. These include access control
for speakers and monitoring of audio stream going to the
speakers which may indicate audio encoded data exfiltration.
For example, an audio stream that consists of DTMF tones
only, could raise an alarm. However, this could be evaded by
using frequencies other than DTMF. Since a VA must send
the audio stream to the cloud, another possible defense is to
examine the audio stream for possible anomalies. A variety
of audio stenography techniques have been investigated in the
literature and their use may evade such defenses.
There are other defenses such as voice biometric verification
such as those used by Google Home and Siri VAs. These
defenses are primarily for commands that are issued to VAs.
Although attacks such as voice conversion [12] and voice
deepfakes [34] can be used, these will be more targeted attacks
and would require access to voice samples of victims. In
contrast, we have explored large scale attacks which could be
more challenging when voice biometric verification is used..
B. Limitations
We demonstrated that an infected computer can command
a VA to set up a phone call that can transmit sixty bits per
second. If we use error correction, thirty data bits can be sent
in a second. Such a rate may not be sufficient to achieve
massive data transfer or large scale data dumps. For example,
a call lasting ten minutes can only exfiltrate approximately
2.5K bytes of data at this rate. Our experiments have not
explored accuracy of data transfer over long duration calls.
Also, the audio may not be completely inaudible to all people
when a carrier lower than 20 kHz is used. In particular, young
children may be able to hear some sounds when they are very
close to the computer or the VA. This may raise an alert.
However, achieving completely inaudible audio transmission
for everyone for large volumes of data over the voiceband of
a telephony call is a problem that has not been fully addressed
by this paper.
We use the phone call feature of Amazon Echo. Although
this feature is useful and likely be provided by VAs, it is
possible that in the future calls are only allowed to certain
phone numbers (e.g., those in a contact list). In this case, an
attacker would have gain access to the voice mail of an allowed
phone number or find a way to get a phone number controlled
by it to the contact list. This is not addressed by us.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As voice assistants become common in the same physical
areas as computers, they could create a new channel for
data exfiltration. In particular, malware infected computers can
bypass normal network and host defenses by using the voice
assistant and the phone channel to send sensitive data to an
attacker controlled computer. We demonstrated that modest
amount of data can be exfiltrated by encoding the data in
audio and transmitting it via a voice assistant initiated phone
call that lasts only a few minutes. By using techniques such
as modulation with very high frequency carriers, it is possible
to send the audio from the computer to the voice assistant in a
way that it is unlikely to be noticed by a person who may be
in the vicinity of these devices. These attacks are of concern
because they can be mounted from anywhere, at scale and at
low cost.
In the future, we plan to explore if the transmission of data
such as text can be made more efficient when it is sent over
the voiceband of a telephony channel. This should be done
while making the transfer completely unnoticeable as has been
demonstrated for commands issued to voice assistants. We
briefly discussed a number of defenses that may be possible
against data exfiltration via voice assistants but their efficacy
is unclear. Also, detection and defenses against malware that
may use the audio channel between the computer and voice
assistants need to be investigated.
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